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S

INCE THE

CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE INTRODUCED THE FIRST INDEX OPTION CON-

TRACT IN

1983, INDEX OPTIONS MARKETS HAVE HAD A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN FINANCIAL MAR-

KETS. INDEX OPTIONS HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL OF THE MANY INNOVATIVE
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS INTRODUCED OVER THE LAST FEW DECADES, AS THEIR HIGH TRADING

volume indicates. Index options give market participants the ability to participate in anticipated market movements without having to buy or sell a large
number of securities, and they permit portfolio
managers to limit downside risk. Given their prominence and functions, the pricing efficiency of these
markets is of great importance to academics, practitioners, and regulators.
Well-functioning financial markets are vital to a
thriving economy because these markets facilitate
price discovery, risk hedging, and allocating capital
to its most productive uses. Inefficient pricing of
index options indicates that their market (and, possibly, other financial markets) is not doing the best
possible job at these important functions. To detect
inefficient pricing (often called mispricing) requires
computing a theoretically efficient price or price
range and comparing it with prices of options traded
in financial markets. But valuing an index option in
theory is complicated and challenging.
40

One popular approach to deriving option pricing
relationships is based on a principal called noarbitrage. This approach is a very powerful tool in
the valuation of financial assets because it does not
make strong assumptions about traders’ behavior or
market price dynamics. The principle simply
assumes that arbitrageurs enter the market and
quickly eliminate mispricing if a riskless profit
opportunity exists. An arbitrageur is an individual
who takes advantage of a situation in which securities are mispriced relative to each other. The arbitrageur buys the underpriced asset and sells the
overpriced asset, locking in a riskless profit. In
doing so, the arbitrageur drives the price of the
underpriced asset up and the price of the overpriced asset down, thus eliminating mispricing.
However, in a well-functioning economy—where
there are no free lunches—there is no portfolio of
assets that has zero cost today and a certain, positive payoff in the future. Similarly, there is no port-
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folio of assets that pays a positive amount with certainty today and requires no payment in the future.
Arbitrage is critical for ensuring market efficiency
because it forces asset prices to return to their
implied, no-arbitrage values.
Many earlier studies report evidence of mispricing
of index options, though arbitrage might have been
limited. In some situations, market frictions restrict
arbitrage so that investors simply cannot take
advantage of available profit opportunities. For
example, if arbitrageurs are subject to capital constraints and they cannot raise the capital necessary
to form the riskless hedge, they will be unable to
undertake trades that would move the market toward an efficient state (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Similarly, the activity of arbitrageurs may be limited
because the stock index underlying the option is
often relatively difficult and costly to reproduce.
To arbitrage based on a mispriced index option,
investors may need to replicate the index by buying
or selling a large basket or set of stocks that is
perfectly correlated with the index. Doing so may be
relatively difficult and costly, even for large investors (Ackert and Tian 1998b, 1999).1
The evidence of index option mispricing has been
taken to indicate that options markets are inefficient and casts doubt on their contributions to price
discovery, hedging, and efficient capital allocation.
This article is a discussion of index option pricing
aimed at analyzing earlier evidence of mispricing
and presenting new evidence on index option pricing and its evolution. It first presents theoretical
pricing relationships implied by no-arbitrage conditions. These conditions place bounds on possible
efficient call and put option prices and imply relative pricing relationships between call and put
option prices. A call (put) option is the option to
buy (sell) an asset. Empirical tests of the conditions
presented provide powerful insight into how options market efficiency has evolved over time. In
contrast to many previous studies of options market
efficiency, the arbitrage strategies examined here
do not involve trading a stock index, and the relationships hold for any given value of the underlying
asset. This approach avoids some of the difficulties
that arise from impediments to arbitrage when, for
example, an investor might have to short sell a large
stock basket—that is, sell shares he or she does not
own by borrowing them from another investor.

The article also reviews earlier studies of the pricing efficiency of index options markets and provides
an empirical examination of the efficiency of the
market for the popular Standard and Poor’s (S&P)
500 index options. The results indicate some substantial deviations of market prices from theoretical
pricing relationships. Importantly, S&P 500 index
options are frequently mispriced, and the mispricing
does not appear to have abated over time. The mispricing may not, however, indicate market inefficiency because there
are limits to arbitrage.

Arbitrage Pricing
Relationships

Index options give market
participants the ability to
participate in anticipated
market movements without
having to buy or sell a
large number of securities,
and they permit portfolio
managers to limit downside risk.

n evaluating the
efficiency of option pricing, a theoretical optimal price
derived from a model
frequently provides
the basis for comparison. Such theoretical
models often assume
specific dynamics for
the underlying asset
in order to derive
more well-defined restrictions on the efficient price.
In contrast, tests of pricing efficiency based solely
on no-arbitrage arguments may be more informative
if the relationships are independent of the models,
though restrictions they place on price may not be
very demanding.
Arbitrage pricing relationships are based on the
simple assumption that investors prefer more to less.
If these pricing relationships are violated by actual
prices after adjustment for the bid-ask spread and
transaction costs, arbitrage profits may be possible by
buying the underpriced asset(s) and short-selling the
overpriced asset(s). As discussed previously, rational
pricing of options imposes explicit restrictions on
the relative prices of call and put options. If these
restrictions are violated, arbitrage opportunities
exist. Some arbitrage pricing relationships jointly
test options and stock market efficiency and allow
examination of the information exchange between
these markets whereas others test options market
efficiency alone and allow examination of how pricing has evolved over time.2 The relationships and

I

1. Note that traders can use the very liquid S&P 500 futures contract to replicate the index.
2. Billingsley and Chance (1985) and Ronn and Ronn (1989) note that some tests are joint tests of options and stock market
efficiency while others consider only options market efficiency. See Ackert and Tian (1998a, 1999) for examples of both types
of relationships.
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empirical tests reported in this article are of the latter type. Because stock market transactions are not
involved, examining these relationships may provide
a superior test of pricing across index options.
Another advantage of these types of relationships is
that they are unaffected by the different closing
times in stock and options markets.
The arbitrage pricing relationships presented
below allow examining whether options market efficiency improved over the sample period. Options on
the S&P 500 index are European, and the discussion
below applies to European options only. A European
option may be exercised only at maturity whereas
an American option may be exercised prior to maturity. All relationships account for the bid-ask spread
because bid-ask spreads result in significant transaction costs for participants in options markets
(Phillips and Smith 1980; Baesel, Shows, and Thorp
1983). Define:
Cb:
Ca:
Pb:
Pa:
S:
X:
T:
r:
ti:

bid price of European call option;
ask price of European call option;
bid price of a European put option;
ask price of a European put option;
price of underlying asset;
strike price;
maturity of the option;
risk-free rate of interest or Treasury bill
rate;3
transaction costs (other than those arising from the bid-ask spread) of buying or
selling calls, puts, or Treasury bills, i = c,
p, or r.

Three sets of arbitrage pricing relationships are
presented: the box spread, call and put spreads, and
call and put convexity. The box spread is a combination of call and put spreads that matches two
pairs of call and put options.4 This strategy requires
that an investor purchase and sell calls (bullish call
spread) with strike prices X1 and X2, respectively,
while simultaneously selling and purchasing puts
(bearish put spread) with strike prices X1 and X2,
respectively. The box spread is a riskless strategy
because the future payoff is always positive: the difference between two strike prices, X2 – X1, where X1
< X2. The payoff is illustrated in Chart 1. If bid-ask
spreads and transaction costs are taken into
account, the box spread is expressed by the following two inequalities:
(C1a – C2b) – (P1b – P 2a) + (X1 – X2)e–rT + t1 ≥ 0 (1a)
and
(C 2a – C1b) – (P 2b – P1a) + (X2 – X1)e–rT + t1 ≥ 0, (1b)
42

where t1 = 2tc + 2tp + tr. In the absence of arbitrage,
inequalities (1a) and (1b) hold.
In contrast to the box spread, the call (put)
spread combines two call (put) options with identical maturity. The call spread strategy requires purchase of call option 1 and sale of call option 2, where
X1 < X2, as illustrated in Chart 2. The call spread is
expressed as
(C 2a – C 1b) + (X2 – X1)e–rT + t2a ≥ 0,

(2a)

where t2a = 2tc + tr. Similarly, the put spread involves
the sale of put option 1 and purchase of put option 2
and is expressed as
(P 1a – P 2b) + (X2 – X1)e–rT + t2b ≥ 0,

(2b)

where t2b = 2tp + tr.
Finally, call (put) convexity creates a riskless position by combining three call (put) options where
X1 < X2< X3. The call (put) convexity strategy
requires purchase of call (put) options 1 and 3 and
sale of call (put) option 2. Call convexity is
expressed as
wC1a + (1 – w)C 3a – C 2b + 2tc ≥ 0

(3a)

and put convexity is
wP 1a + (1 – w)P 3a – P 2b + 2tp ≥ 0,

(3b)

where w = (X3 – X2)/(X3 – X1). So, for example, if
w = 1⁄2, call convexity involves the purchase of one
call option 1 and one call option 3 for every two call
option 2s sold. The payoff from this strategy, commonly referred to as a butterfly spread, is illustrated
in Chart 3.
If the box spread, call spread, put spread, call convexity, or put convexity is violated, arbitrage profits
are possible by taking appropriate option positions.
For example, if the call spread (2a) is violated,
index call option 1 is overvalued relative to call
option 2. The arbitrageur would sell call 1 and buy
call 2, investing the balance in a Treasury bill earning the risk-free rate. In the case of exercise of both
call options at maturity, the arbitrageur closes the
index position and earns a risk-free profit at maturity (time T) of (C 1b – C 2a) + (X1 – X2)e–rT – t2a ≥ 0,
where t2a = 2tc + tr (see the box for the details of this
arbitrage).
Although a violation of any of the inequalities
above indicates the presence of an arbitrage
opportunity, the box spread inequalities (1a) and
(1b) place more demanding restrictions on the
pricing of options. In the absence of transaction
costs, the box spread requires an equality among
four option prices. In contrast, even ignoring trans-
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C H A R T 1 Box Spread Payoff

C H A R T 2 Call Spread Payoff

Box Spread

X2 – X1

Bullish Call Spread
(Buy 1, Sell 2)

Payoff

Payoff

Buy Call 1
X2 – X1

Bearish Put Spread
(Sell 1, Buy 2)
X1

X2

Call Spread

X1
Sell Call 2

ST

C H A R T 3 Call Convexity ( w =

action costs, call and put spreads and convexity are
minimum-maximum (inequality) restrictions, and a
wide range of prices is consistent with the boundaries they place on option prices, as is apparent in
Charts 1–3.
Payoff

any empirical studies have tested pricing
relations between put and call options, particularly for options on individual stocks.
See, for example, Stoll (1969), Gould and Galai
(1974), and Klemkosky and Resnick (1979). Some
of these tests are based on theoretical option pricing
models, such as the Black-Scholes (1973) or the
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) binomial option
pricing models. Other tests are based simply on
arbitrage arguments and are model-independent,
including, for example, the box spread.
Although the empirical evidence generally supports some pricing relationships like put-call parity
for individual stock options, significant mispricing
has been reported in stock index options markets.
For example, Evnine and Rudd (1985) use intraday
data for a two-month period in 1984 and find frequent violations of boundary conditions and put-call
parity for S&P 100 and Major Market index options,

1

⁄2

)

Buy Call 1

Buy Call 3

X3 – X2 = X2 – X1

Efficiency of Index Options Markets

M

ST

X2

X1

X2

X3

ST

Call Convexity
Sell 2, Call 2

both of which are American options.5 Evnine and
Rudd further conclude that these options are significantly mispriced relative to theoretical values
based on the binomial option pricing model. Chance
(1987) also finds that put-call parity and the box
spread are violated frequently for S&P 100 index
options and that the violations are significant in
size.6 However, these results may not indicate market inefficiency for several reasons.

3. The assumption is that borrowing and lending rates are equal. Regarding the impact of this assumption on the results, see
note 14.
4. The box spread is also a simple algebraic combination of the put-call parity relationship for each option. Put-call parity relates
the put price, call price, exercise price, risk-free interest rate, and underlying asset price for options on the same asset with
identical exercise price and expiration date. According to put-call parity, a pair of call and put options with identical maturity and strike price should be priced such that C + Xe–rT = P + S, ignoring transaction costs and the bid-ask spread.
5. A boundary condition specifies a maximum or minimum price for an option. For example, an upper bound on the price of a
call option is the value of the underlying asset because, no matter what happens, the option can never be worth more than
the asset, that is, C ≤ S. See note 4 above on put-call parity. For derivations of the various pricing relationships, see Merton
(1973), Cox and Rubinstein (1985), Chance (1987), and Hull (1997).
6. In another study, Chance (1986) examines whether S&P 100 option prices are consistent with the Black-Scholes model and
concludes that the model cannot be used to generate abnormal returns.
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B O X

Arbitrage Opportunity When the
Call Spread Does Not Hold
gnoring the bid-ask spread and transaction costs, the
call spread is expressed as

I

(C2 – C1) + (X2 – X1)e–rT ≥ 0.
Without loss of generality, it is always possible to
rearrange the pair of calls so that X1 < X2. Given this
arrangement, the price of the first call should always be
greater than that of the second call; that is, C1 > C2. If
the call spread is violated, that is, if
(C2 – C1) + (X2 – X1)e–rT < 0,
then risk-free profit opportunities are present.
Arbitrage profits are possible by taking appropriate
positions in the options market. In this case, index call
option 1 is overvalued relative to call option 2. The
arbitrageur would sell call 1, buy call 2, and invest the
balance in a Treasury bill earning the risk-free rate. At
maturity, a call option is exercised if the stock price
exceeds its exercise price. The cash flows from the
strategy are as shown in the table.
At the inception of this strategy there is no initial
investment, and at maturity there are three possible
cash flows, all of which are positive. When S < X1, nei-

ther option is exercised upon maturity and the arbitrageur accrues the entire amount invested in the
Treasury bill as profit; that is, (C1 – C2)erT > 0. When X1
< S ≤ X2, option 1 is exercised but not option 2 and the
investment in the Treasury bill more than offsets the
loss on the first option so that
(C1 – C2)erT – (S – X1) > (C1 – C2)erT – (X2 – X1) > 0.
The first inequality holds because (X1 – S) > (X1 –
X2) when X1 < S ≤ X2, and the second, because the call
spread is violated. Finally, if both options are exercised
at maturity, positive profit also accrues, again because
the call spread is violated. Therefore, profit is made by
the arbitrageur in all three possible outcomes. After
commission fees and the bid-ask spread are recognized, the violation of (2a) (see Tables 4 and 5) must
be large enough to compensate for transaction costs;
that is,
(C2a – C1b) + (X2 – X1)e–rT + t2a < 0.
Such an opportunity cannot persist as arbitrageurs will
take advantage of the mispricing until (2a) holds.

Arbitrage When the Call Spread Is Violated
Cash Flow
At Options’ Maturity
Today

S < X1

X1 < S ≤ X2

S > X2

Sell call 1

+C1

—

–(S – X1)

– (S – X1)

Sell call 2

–C2

—

—

S – X2

–(C1 – C2)

(C1 – C2)erT

(C1 – C2)erT

(C1 – C2)erT

0

(C1 – C2)erT

(C1 – C2)erT – (S – X1)

(C1 – C2)erT – (X2 – X1)

Strategy

Buy Treasury bill
Total

These tests of market efficiency may be misleading
because they use American options and the arbitrage
conditions are for European options. Kamara and
Miller (1995) point out that prior to their examination all tests of put-call parity used American options.
In addition, tests of other arbitrage pricing relationships such as the box spread used data for American
44

options (for example, Billingsley and Chance 1985).
Because of the possibility of early exercise, these
relationships may not be expected to hold for
American options, and similar conditions for
American options are frequently intractable. In their
tests using S&P 500 index options that are European,
Kamara and Miller find fewer and smaller violations.
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Tests of put-call parity may also fail to indicate
market inefficiency if arbitrage at low cost is not possible. Introducing index options helps to reduce arbitrage costs. In Canada, a stock basket, Toronto Index
Participation Units (TIPS 35), has been traded since
1990. Ackert and Tian (1998a) examine the efficiency of Canadian index and options markets by
comparing the number and size of violations in theoretical pricing relationships before and after the
introduction of TIPs. They conclude that, although
options market efficiency improved over their test
period, the connection between options markets
and stock markets did not. Ackert and Tian (1999)
also examine the impact of a traded stock basket,
Standard and Poor’s Depositary Receipts (SPDRs),
on the link between U.S. index options markets.
They conclude that the introduction of a stock
basket can enhance market efficiency because it
removes one limit to arbitrage.
In summary, the results reported in earlier studies
suggest that put-call parity is frequently violated in
index options markets and that these options are
often mispriced relative to prices predicted by theoretical models. To overcome problems in earlier
studies, this study tests theoretical pricing relationships based on no-arbitrage conditions for European
stock index options. It focuses on tests of options
market efficiency independent of the stock market
and includes the effects of transaction costs and
bid-ask spreads. It also examines whether deviations from pricing relations declined over the
1986–96 sample period.

Empirical Results
ll three arbitrage pricing relationships presented earlier are investigated for S&P 500
index options on each trading day in the
sample, as described subsequently. The number and
size of violations are recorded and analyzed. This
approach allows examining the evolution of the
index options market and provides insight into
whether market efficiency increased over the sam-

A

ple period. Arbitrage based on violations of the relationships considered does not require a position in
the underlying asset. In addition, all of the pricing
relationships are independent of an option pricing
model so that no assumption concerning the process
underlying the stock price is required. Thus, the
empirical tests are true tests of market efficiency
instead of joint tests of market efficiency and model
specification.7 Finally, the analysis recognizes the
limits that transaction costs and bid-ask spreads
place on arbitrage.
The empirical investigation analyzes the efficiency
of the S&P 500 index options market using daily data
for the S&P 500 index and index options from January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996. Daily closing
prices, trading volume, and open interest for S&P 500
index call and put options are from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange.8 The three-month Treasury bill
rate (a proxy for the risk-free interest rate) is from
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Bid-ask spreads and
commissions are included so that the analysis recognizes the effect of transaction costs on pricing efficiency. The approach is conservative in that it uses
closing bid and ask prices, rather than closing prices,
in testing the pricing relationships.9 Following
Harris, Sofianos, and Shapiro (1994) and Kamara
and Miller (1995), this research constructs bid and
ask prices, based on the usual spread in option
prices, from closing prices. The option bid-ask
spread is estimated by adding or subtracting 1⁄32 (1⁄16)
of a point if the price is less than (greater than or
equal to) $3.10 Following Kamara and Miller (1995),
commission costs (ti) are $30 for Treasury bills and
$2 ($4) per option contract for 100 shares if the price
is less than (greater than or equal to) $1.
On each trading day during the test period, the
three pricing relationships discussed above are
tested: the box spread (1a) and (1b), call and put
spreads (2a) and (2b), and call and put convexity
(3a) and (3b). For each maturity month, two pairs
of put and call options are used to examine the box
spread. The put and call within each pair are matched

7. So, for example, there is no test of whether prices are consistent with those predicted by a particular model such as the
Black-Scholes option pricing model.
8. All relationships tested require synchronous option prices. Inferences are limited by the fact that closing prices may be nonsynchronous. However, Evnine and Rudd (1985) and Kamara and Miller (1995) find very similar results using intraday and
closing price data for S&P 100 and S&P 500 index options, respectively.
9. See Ronn and Ronn (1989), who demonstrate that the use of bid-ask prices is conservative. They note that the market maker
commits to transacting at least one contract at the bid-ask quotes, but the effective spread may be narrower. Traders are sometimes able to bargain to obtain better prices so that trades occur inside the quoted spread.
10. Some traders may have access to better price quotes. The assumption in this article concerning the constructed spread
appears to be reasonable based on the results reported by others, though the results may be affected by the assumption to
the extent that the spread is over- or underestimated.
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with an identical strike price, but two different
strike prices are used for the two pairs. In contrast,
the call (put) spread combines two call (put)
options with identical maturity and different strike
prices. Finally, call (put) convexity combines three
call (put) options with identical maturity and different strike prices.
The frequency and severity of violations are tabulated for the full sample period as well as for each
year in the sample.11 Examining violations in the
pricing relationships for each sample year provides
insight into how the efficiency of the options market
has changed as the market has developed over time.
Tables 1 through 9 report the percentage of violations as well as the mean violation in dollars.
Significant dollar violations are tested for by testing
the null hypothesis that the mean dollar violation is
zero. All reported t statistics use standard errors
corrected for autocorrelation using a maximum likelihood procedure estimated by a Gauss-Marquardt
algorithm (Judge and others 1985).12
To further investigate the persistence of violations
in pricing relationships, the study examines whether
arbitrage opportunities are evident the day following
observed violations. Doing so provides an ex ante
test, which, as Galai (1977) argues, a true test of
market efficiency must be. Ex ante tests are executed from the trader’s point of view and reflect the
trader’s ability to actually form the required, profitable portfolio. In an ex ante approach, current

prices reveal arbitrage opportunities but execution
is at prices that are yet to be revealed. Conducting
ex ante tests involves identifying each day on which
a particular violation occurs and tracking whether
the violation persisted on the following trading day.
Existence on the following day implies that traders
did not fully eliminate arbitrage opportunities.
Table 1 reports the frequency and severity of violations and ex ante violations of the box spread,
inequalities (1a) and (1b). For the two inequalities,
the percentage and dollar amount of violations are
similar (21.02 percent and $1.07 versus 23.78 percent and $1.08). For each relationship, the percentage of violations is substantial and the mean dollar
violation is significantly different from zero.13 The ex
ante tests indicate that significant abnormal profit
opportunities existed even on the day following the
violation of a pricing relationship. For example,
28,292 violations of (1a) occurred, and of these violations 2,785 or 9.84 percent persisted on the following
day with a significant mean violation of $1.02.14
Tables 2 and 3 report the percentage and dollar size
of violations and ex ante violations of (1a) and (1b),
respectively, for each year in the 1986–96 sample
period. All mean dollar violations are significantly
different from zero at the 1 percent significance
level. Although some variation is observed in the
extent to which the pricing relationships are violated
across years, the results provide no evidence that
options market efficiency improved over the sample

T A B L E 1 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Box Spread (1a) and (1b)
Box Spread (1a)
Total
Violations

Ex Ante
Violations

Box Spread (1b)
Total
Violations

Ex Ante
Violations

Frequency of Violations
Number of Observations
Number of Violations
Percentage of Violations

134,606

28,292

134,606

32,014

28,292

2,785

32,014

3,210

21.02

9.84

23.78

10.03

Violations, in Dollars
Mean

1.07

1.02

1.08

1.11

Standard Deviation

1.05

1.00

1.07

1.09

t statistic for nonzero mean

170.00***

54.19***

180.36***

57.74***

Note: This table reports the frequency and dollar size of violations of the box spread (1a) and (1b) using daily data for the S&P 500 index
and index options from January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation persists into
the following trading day. Asterisks *,**, or *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a
two-tailed test.
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T A B L E 2 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Box Spread (1a) by Year
Total Violations

Ex Ante Violations

Sample Year

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

1986

18.72

0.83

4.35

0.76

1987

22.30

1.24

8.03

1.13

1988

20.34

0.86

5.83

0.85

1989

13.94

0.91

7.54

0.81

1990

24.06

1.06

12.18

1.01

1991

21.62

0.99

9.11

0.90

1992

17.03

0.78

9.21

0.92

1993

18.29

0.86

9.42

0.76

1994

17.69

0.92

8.99

0.87

1995

20.76

1.02

10.75

1.05

1996

25.96

1.35

11.14

1.23

Overall

21.02

1.07

9.84

1.02

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of the box spread (1a) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular
violation persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.

period. The frequency of violations remains high
at approximately 20 percent of observations, even
after taking into account trading costs, including the
bid-ask spread and commission fees.
Next, violations of call and put spreads (2a) and
(2b) and call and put convexity (3a) and (3b) are
examined. As reported in Tables 4 and 7, significant
mean dollar violations and ex ante dollar
violations were observed for all four relationships.
However, for all four the frequency of violations is
quite low. The maximum percentage of violations
(ex ante violations) across the four inequalities for
the full sample is only 3.08 percent (8.04 percent).
When the percentage and dollar violations by year
reported in Tables 5 and 6 (8 and 9) for call and
put spreads (convexity) are considered, there is no
apparent trend. Although market efficiency does
not appear to have improved over the sample

period, the results suggest that options market valuations were generally consistent with these theoretical predictions.
A numerical example for the call spread provides
perspective on the size of the violations reported in
this article. On January 4, 1996, call options expiring on March 16, 1996, with strike prices 610 (X1)
and 615 (X2) were priced at $23.25 (C1) and $15.50
(C2). The maturity date translates into a time to
maturity of 0.1973 years (T), and the continuously
compounded Treasury bill rate is 5.29 percent (r).
Using inequality (2a) and ignoring transaction costs
results in 15.50 – 23.25 + (615 – 610)e(–0.0529 × 0.1973)
= –2.8019 so that the size of the violation is $2.80.
Transaction costs are the sum of commission fees
and the bid-ask spread and are (4 + 4 + 30)/100
+ 1/8 = 0.505, which gives a net violation of $2.30
(–2.8019 + 0.505).

11. In some cases, a few extreme outliers were detected. After checking and rechecking the original data sources, these outliers
remained. However, removing these outliers does not change statistical inferences.
12. Autocorrelation in the dollar violations might be expected because the time to maturity for sample options may overlap.
Diagnostic tests confirm the presence of significant positive autocorrelation. However, inferences are unchanged if ordinary
least squares standard errors are used.
13. Note that inequality (1a) involves lending whereas inequality (1b) requires borrowing. Because similar frequency and magnitude of violations are observed across the two inequalities, the results suggest that the assumption of equal borrowing and
lending rates does not explain the extent of profit opportunities.
14. Abnormal profit opportunities are not expected to persist and, thus, the mean ex post violation is expected to be zero.
However, no directional relationship in the percentage of violations over the two-day time period is posited.
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T A B L E 3 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Box Spread (1b) by Year
Total Violations
Percentage of
Violations

Sample Year

Ex Ante Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

1986

21.32

0.83

7.07

0.60

1987

26.23

1.27

11.16

1.26

1988

21.56

0.95

5.65

0.67

1989

15.90

0.90

6.36

0.86

1990

25.11

1.03

8.99

1.12

1991

24.16

0.99

9.28

1.03

1992

20.25

0.88

8.45

0.84

1993

19.19

0.81

6.77

0.67

1994

19.73

0.91

8.89

1.04

1995

23.87

0.95

10.61

0.83

1996

30.54

1.41

13.17

1.42

Overall

23.78

1.08

10.03

1.11

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of the box spread (1b) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular
violation persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.

TABLE 4

Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Call Spread (2a) and Put Spread (2b)
Call Spread (2a)
Total
Violations

Put Spread (2b)

Ex Ante
Violations

Total
Violations

Ex Ante
Violations

Frequency of Violations
Number of Observations
Number of Violations
Percentage of Violations

283,345

5,806

537,701

2,159

5,806

467

2,159

145

2.05

8.04

0.40

6.72

Violations, in Dollars
Mean

1.05

1.09

1.30

1.08

Standard Deviation

1.04

1.06

1.22

1.06

t statistic for nonzero mean

77.24***

22.13***

49.47***

12.27***

Note: This table reports the frequency and dollar size of violations of the call spread (2a) and put spread (2b) using daily data for the S&P
500 index and index options from January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day. Asterisks *,**, or *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively, in a two-tailed test.

48

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta E C O N O M I C R E V I E W First Quarter 2000

Ackert-Tian

5/17/00

10:20 AM

TABLE 5

Page 49

Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Call Spread (2a) by Year
Total Violations

Ex Ante Violations

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Percentage of
Violations

1986

1.08

0.81

7.69

1.72

1987

2.10

0.92

8.70

0.70

1988

1.14

0.85

2.69

1.95

1989

1.71

0.91

6.54

0.86

1990

0.80

0.85

7.07

1.11

1991

3.14

1.17

8.36

0.90

1992

1.64

0.98

7.51

1.21

1993

1.48

0.73

6.65

0.52

1994

0.70

0.88

2.46

0.91

1995

3.92

0.99

11.16

1.14

1996

2.21

1.36

6.18

1.47

Overall

2.05

1.05

8.04

1.09

Sample Year

Mean Dollar
Violation

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of the call spread (2a) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.

TABLE 6

Violations and Ex Ante Violations of the Put Spread (2b) by Year
Total Violations

Ex Ante Violations

Sample Year

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

1986

0.31

0.97

0

0

1987

1.83

1.75

4.75

1.66

1988

0.48

0.81

3.91

0.37

1989

0.19

0.90

3.70

0.25

1990

0.87

1.13

8.00

0.96

1991

0.25

0.97

4.42

0.43

1992

0.24

0.79

7.29

0.74

1993

0.17

0.96

2.78

0.19

1994

0.45

1.05

9.51

0.88

1995

0.12

1.00

9.80

1.06

1996

0.29

1.65

8.06

1.34

Overall

0.40

1.30

6.72

1.08

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of the put spread (2b) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.
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T A B L E 7 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of Call Convexity (3a) and Put Convexity (3b)
Call Convexity (3a)
Total
Violations

Ex Ante
Violations

Put Convexity (3b)
Total
Violations

Ex Ante
Violations

Frequency of Violations
Number of Observations

882,954

27,206

2,244,467

20,439

Number of Violations

27,206

1,659

20,439

844

3.08

6.10

0.91

4.13

Percentage of Violations

Violations, in Dollars
Mean

0.91

1.13

0.95

1.21

Standard Deviation

0.94

1.07

1.04

1.14

t statistic for
nonzero mean

159.98***

43.01***

131.12***

30.81***

Note: This table reports the frequency and dollar size of violations of call convexity (3a) and put convexity (3b) using daily data for the
S&P 500 index and index options from January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular
violation persists into the following trading day. Asterisks *,**, or *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.

T A B L E 8 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of Call Convexity (3a) by Year
Total Violations

Ex Ante Violations

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

1986

2.11

0.72

0.61

0.02

1987

3.83

0.99

9.82

1.29

1988

1.37

0.79

1.12

0.20

1989

2.23

0.76

2.29

0.80

1990

1.76

0.64

4.07

0.72

1991

4.32

1.00

8.41

1.09

1992

1.82

0.75

3.17

1.02

1993

1.66

0.54

4.00

0.36

1994

0.85

0.55

4.09

0.82

1995

4.98

0.85

6.65

1.05

1996

3.45

1.07

5.12

1.33

Overall

3.08

0.91

6.10

1.13

Sample Year

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of call convexity (3a) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.
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T A B L E 9 Violations and Ex Ante Violations of Put Convexity (3b) by Year
Total Violations

Ex Ante Violations

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

1986

1.06

0.58

0

0

1987

4.21

1.53

6.31

1.76

1988

0.77

0.71

2.06

0.49

1989

0.40

0.64

1.03

0.13

1990

1.82

0.82

5.59

0.93

1991

0.56

0.76

2.00

0.66

1992

0.45

0.70

2.91

0.70

1993

0.20

0.56

0.36

0.33

1994

0.76

0.78

3.94

1.13

1995

0.29

0.52

2.05

0.36

1996

1.01

0.89

3.51

1.06

Overall

0.91

0.95

4.13

1.21

Sample Year

Percentage of
Violations

Mean Dollar
Violation

Note: This table reports the percentage and dollar size of violations of put convexity (3b) using daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options for each year in the January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1996, sample period. An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day. All mean dollar violations are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level.

Taken together, significant violations of arbitrage
pricing relationships are observed, even using ex
ante tests, particularly for the box spread relationship. The differing results across the relationships
tested are not surprising because the box spread is
a more demanding test of market efficiency as compared with call and put spreads or convexity. The
overall finding is that S&P 500 index options are frequently mispriced to a significant extent and that
options market efficiency has not changed markedly
over time.

Conclusion
his article examines the efficiency of the S&P
500 index options market using theoretical
pricing relationships derived from stock
index option no-arbitrage principles. It reports frequent and substantial violations of the box spread

T

relationship in particular, even though the analysis
reflects transaction costs. The results do not provide support for the argument that options market
efficiency improved over time. However, at the same
time, there were few violations of call and put
spreads and convexity, which are less demanding
tests of pricing efficiency than the box spread.
Market frictions appear to have a significant effect
on arbitrageurs’ abilities to take advantage of violations of no-arbitrage pricing relationships. Although
the analysis reflects the market frictions imposed
by the bid-ask spread and commission costs, other
frictions may be significant. One such friction may
be insufficient liquidity, which increases option
traders’ risk and may prevent them from eliminating
arbitrage opportunities. In a liquid market a transaction can be quickly completed with little impact
on prices.
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